Proposed Regulations on Noncompensatory Options: A Light at the End of the Tunnel by Schwidetzky, Walter D.
University of Baltimore Law
ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law
All Faculty Scholarship Faculty Scholarship
Winter 2004
Proposed Regulations on Noncompensatory
Options: A Light at the End of the Tunnel
Walter D. Schwidetzky
University of Baltimore School of Law, wschwidetzky@ubalt.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/all_fac
Part of the Taxation-Federal Commons, and the Tax Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been
accepted for inclusion in All Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more
information, please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.
Recommended Citation















Proposed Regulations on 
Noncompensatory Options: a Light 
at the End of the Tunnel 
Walter D. Schwidetzky* 
II has become increasingly roml/wn for partnerships to 
issue options.' There is a dearth of authority on the federal tax 
treatment of options to acquire interests in partnerships. In this 
context, there are two main categories of options, "services 
options" and "noncompensatory options." Services oplions, 
ufISllrprisingly, are options to acquire partnership interests where 
the option is received in exchange for sen,ices. Noncompensatory 
options cover the rest of the waletfront. 2 The simplest version 
of the latter would be partnership analog to "normal" options 
jilund outside the partnership context: the option holder pays 
the partnership an "option premium" to acquire an option to 
purchase a partnership ime rest sometime in the future for a fixed 
price. A previous article by this author discussed services 
options, J an<1 rhis article serves as a cOlllpanion piece,.focusing 
:': "'alter D, Schwidetzky is a professor at the Universily of Baltimore School of 
l.Al\V. He can be contacted at w';chwiderzky@ubmail.ubalt.adu. The author wishes to 
thank Professors Fred Brown of the Cniversity of Baltimore School of Law and Dan 
Goldberg of the University of Maryland School of Law fol' thCjf helpful suggestiuns. 
insights, COl1eCD.OnS, and editorial comments, 
1 At the outset, the author must acknowledge his- indebtedness to the "Options Group" 
compos.ed of members ofthe Partnerships. Real Estate, and Employee Ben<;;fits Commil-
tees of the ABA Section of Taxation. The Options Gronp, of which the author was a 
member, submitted extensive recommendations to the Service on the taxation of partner-
ship options generally, sexily entitled "Comments in Response to Notice 2002~29." Af-
ter the Service l~sued proposed regulationt> on noncompensatory optiom, the Options 
Group submitted a second set of extensive recommendations, with tbe equaHy sexy title. 
"Comments in Response to REG-l003580-02" (hereinafter "ABA Comments"). The 
author's understanding of this area was dramatically improved by participation in thi;, 
group of first~rate tax lmvye-rs, whose efforts were headed by Paul Carman of Chapman 
nnd Cutler. Paul Carman ':; command of detail and ability to connect the various pieces of 
the puzzle together can only be descnbed as extraordinary. Also a thanks goes. to my 
significant other, Bonnie Charon, and our cntf;, Lilly and Cleo, \vhose names are taken in 
vain in the examples, 
'Sec Prop. Reg. L72I-2(d). 
:; 'Natter D, Schwidetzky, "Options to Acquire Partnership Interests, Can the Tax. 
Law Keep PaceT' 20(2) Journal of Inve>lment Taxation 99 (\~linter 2003) ~hereiliafLer 
'"Schwidetzky I"). 
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primarily on the recently issued proposed regulations" on the 
tax treatmelll of noncompensatory options. The article Yv'ill 
describe and analyze the proposed regulations and (4fer 
alternatives. While the term "partnership" will be used 
throughout this article, the reader should recall thatforfederal 
income tax purposes il normally includes limited liability 
companies (LLCs) provided they have more than one member.5 
Background 
The basic principles that apply to the taxation of the issuance and exercise 
of noncompensatory options have been clear for some time. They are con-
tained in IRe Section I 234 and various pronouncements of the courts and 
the Service;' 
(i) Option contracts are generally treated as open transactions' until 
exercise or expiration; 
(iil There is no federal income tax consequence on account of either 
the receipt or the payment of the option premium by either the issuer 
or the option holder until the option is exercised or terminated;' 
(iii) Under Section I 234(a), if the option goes unexercised, the option 
holder is trealed as having a loss from the sale or exchange of 
property which has the same character as the propelty to which 
the option relates. Thus, if the option relates 10 a capital asset, the 
loss will be a long or short term capital loss depending on how 
long the option holder has held the option. Regardless of how 
long the option is outManding, the option issuer's gain on the lapse 
is short term capital gain under Section 1234(b). 
'REG-I03Sg0-02. RIN 1545-BA53. Noncompensatory Partnership Options 68 Fed. 
Reg. 2930 (January 12. 2003) (hereinafter "proposed regulatioo,"l. The proposed regu-
latioo, were privately published at 2()03 Tax Notes Today 14-13. 
~ Reg. 301.7701-3(b). assuming the default ruJi: apphes and no election Otlt is mnde. 
For a di~cussion uf options to pw·cnase an interesl in a disregarded entity see ABA Com-
ments, at IVF3. 
(, Palmer v. Comm'r. 302 U.S. 63 (1937). Rev. Rul. 58-234, IQS8-1 CB 279 (as 
clarified in Rev. Rut. 68-151. 1968-1 CIl 363), Rev. Rul. 78·182,1978-1 CB 265; see 
ABA Comments. at IUD 1. 
.., "An open transaction" generally means that 110 tax consequences apply while it is 
"open." In this context. there are wmally no tax consequences until the option i:-; exer-
cised or lap::,e~, there-by closing the open transaction. 
li This a",,;umes th~ premium is paid in cash. If property is transferred in exchange 
for the option, IRe Section 100 I would require gain or loss recognition on the transfer, 
Sec TIS. 19-20 infra and accompanying text. 
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(iv) Upon exercise, both the issuer and the option holder use the total 
of the option premium and the exercise price to determine the 
amount realized ou the sale and the cost basis of the property 
acquired, respectively, and 
(v) Exercise of a option at a time when the value of the relevant prop-
erty had risen above the exercise price of the option does not cause 
the Option holder to have income. The Proposed regulations de-
part from this principle in a limited way, as will be discussed," 
If the option holder disposes of the option before exercise, it is treated 
like any other disposition of property. Gain or loss is recognized under 
Section 1001 unless an exclusionary rule applies. 
When an emity issues interests in itself, it can rai se tax issues in 
addition to those discussed above. Lnti! the Service issued the proposed 
regulations, there was no guidance in the partnership context, 10 but there 
has been guidance for some time with regard to corporations. Section 
I 032(a) provides that a corporation recognizes no gain or loss on the lapse 
or acquisition of an option to buy or sell its stock. The actual exercise of 
the option would not be taxable to the corporation either, as Section 1032(a) 
also provides that a corporation recognizes no gain or loss on the receipt 
of money or other property for its stock. The treatment of the option holder 
is covered by the regular rules discussed above. 
Partnerships are very different taX (and nontax) creatures than corpo-
rations, and when they issue options they raise different tax issues. Most 
of the issues that ali se relate to the fact that unlike C corporations, partner-
ships are not taxable entities, income is taxed to and losses are deducted 
by the partners. Appreciation in partnership property and undistributed 
income typically inures in pM to the benefit of the option holder, How 
should the partnership keep track of that benefit? Since the economics of a 
partner's investment in the p,U'tnership are generally measured by the 
partner's capital account, a corollary question is how should capital ac-
counts be kept when an option is outstanding? If a new partner acquires a 
partnership interest while an option is outstanding, how should the exist-
ence of the option be taken into account? There arc times when an option 
holder should be treated as a partner. If there were no anti-abuse rules, 
ta,'lpayers could give option holders so many rights that they would have 
all the economic benefits of being a partner without actually being treated 
as a partner. High bracket taxpayers would buy options, avoid taxable or-
dinary income on the partnership earnings, though the option economi-
'J See discussion of corriXlive allocation;:.; infra. 
'<J Technically there is still no guidance as the regulations are in proposed form; 
hmvcver, it wm doubtless inform the decision muking process of tax practitioners, 
~ " 
" 
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cally benefit from undistributed earnings, and then sell the option at a long 
term capital gain and receive preferential tax rates, The proposed regula-
tions address these and other issues, 
Another piece oftbe puzzle is Section 721, It provides that no gain or 
loss is recognized to a partnership or its partners in the case of a contribu-
tion of property to the partnership in exchange for a partnership interest A 
major question is wben and how Section 721 applies in the options con-
text, To the extent it does apply, the transaction becomes nontaxable, the 
tax equivalent of the promised land, In the typical, nonabusive case, the pro-
posed regulations sensibly take the view that an option holder is not a partner. 
Accordingly, the issuance of the option is not within the purview of Section 
721 (though the issuance of an option usually is still nontaxable). Section 721 
usnally literally applies to the exercise of the option, however, inasmuch as 
then a partnership interest is being received for cash or property. 
A final issue involves the potential for capital account shifts between 
the partners. Indeed, there may be no single issue more important than this 
one. \X,11cn an option holder exercises an appreciated option, it may be 
necessary to shift capital from the continuing partners to the option holder! 
partner to give the him his appropriate interest in the partnership. The 
form of this would be a transfer of a portion of the capital account bal-
ances from the continuing partners to the option holder/partner. The fear 
has been that this "capital shift" could be seen as a taxable transfer of 
partnership property by the continuing partners to the option holder/part-
ner in an amonnt equal to the value of the capital shift. If the continuing 
partners transferred 5% of partnership capital to the option holder/partner, 
could they have made a taxable disposition of 5% of the partnership assets 
and have to recognize the associated gain or loss? If so, it would obviously 
inhibit option (and other) transactions, at least where gain would be recog-
nized. No case ever held that such a capital shift was a taxable transaction 
to the continuing partners, but academics and practitioners have spilt a lot 
of ink speculating on this possibility, The proposed regulations gener-
ally put the fear to rest in the partnership options context. A capital 
shift is not treated as a taxable transfer of the underlying partnership 
property, though there can be an income tax effect to the option holder! 
partner, as I will discuss 11 
Scope of Proposed Regulations 
The proposed regulations only cover noncompensatory options issued by 
pmtnerships." In addition [0 "standard" options, the proposed regulations 
tI See dj~cussion of corrective allQCations infra: also see lYkDougnl v. Comm'r, 62 
TC 720 (1974) where a tran..;fer\vtls taxable where tht: COUll deemed the! sequence to be the 
transfer or properly to a servlce provider followed by the fonnation of the partnenhip, 
!~ Prop. Reg. 1.721 ~2{d): the propo~ed regulations do not apply to any interest 011 con~ 
vertiblede-bt that ha.<.; been aCCllled by the partneffioip (including original isslle discount), Id. 
PROPOSED REGULATIONS ON NONCOMPENSATORY OPTIONS 159 
can also apply to warrants, convertible debt, and convenible preferred 
equity, though I will focus on traditional options." The final regulations 
will be prospective from the date they are promulgated. 14 "Vlllle the pro-
posed regulations are technically of no legal effect. they do give taxpayers 
a sense of where the Service stands and that can be useful in planning. IS 
The proposed regulations require that the capital account mainten'ance 
provisions in the partnership agreement comply with the proposed regula-
tions. If existing capital account maintenance provisions incorporate the 
regulations by reference, as is commonly recommended, existing partner-
ships will not have to amend the partnership agreements to comply with 
the option regulations when they are finalized. If, 011 the other hand, an 
existing agreement recites the pre-option regulation capital account rules, 
the agreement will have to be amended to bring it up to date when tbe 
regulations are finalized." 
Issuance, Lapse, and Straightforward Exercise 
In line with the exi,ting nonpartnership authority, it is apparent from the 
proposed regulations that tbe issuance of the option usually is treated as an 
Prop. Reg. L721-2(e)(l); it i~ clear from the preamble that the proposed regula-
tions apply to "cash settlement options." Theile arc options in which parties do not imend 
for the option holder ever to become a partnc.r, Rather, on exercise, the option holder is to 
be paid a cash amount equal to the value of the partnership interest subjct.:{ to exercise 
les') the exerdse price, See ABA Comment'>, at (V83. 
\4 Prop. Reg. 1.721 
IS The Service has informally suggested that it sees the proposed regulations a~ 
applying to any provision that causes an adju~tment to the partncrs' interests in the patt-
nership. Partnership agreement." commonly provide for contribution of additional capi-
tal either voluntarily or upon the Qccun'ence of specific events. If "options" we're [0 
include these provisions., the scope of the regulations would be extraordinarily broad and 
make life mucb more complicated for partnerships and their partners, many of whom 
lack the sophi<;tication to ma..;;ter regulations as complex as the ones being prop()~e-il 
There ate other cifCllm~tances that could lead to adju~tmcnts of partners' intcrc:-;ts. such 
as redeeming a partner's partnership interest at a discount Little purpose would seem to 
be served by such a broad interpretation of the regulations. \Vhen finali('-ed the regula-
tions should make clear that they apply to cir\,;umstances specifically covered by the 
regulations <lnd no others, see ABA Comments, at IVS 1. 
ie Capital accounts. unlike tux bu;;is, are designed to measure- the liquidation value 
of a partner';) inv{',stmenL though they are often jnaccuratc as gain or loss inherent in 
partnership as:-cts are often not reflected in the capital accounts unti I the interest is adu~ 
ally liquidated. Gencntlly speaking, capitai account·; arc increased by the moncy and fair 
market value of property contribufed by a partner a'5 well as that partner's share of part-
nership income. Capital accounts are decreased by money and the fair marke1 value of 
property distributed to <l partner, by that partner's share of Josscs, and any expenditures 
allocable to a partner that are neither dednctlble nor capitalized. See Reg. 1.704-
!(b)(2)(iv)(b); sec "Villis, Pennell, Pmue\vaile. Partnership Taxation. 6:11 Edition,,at 11 
10.04[21 (hereinafter WPP); ahe <eo Richard M. Lipton and John D. McDonald. Non-
compensatory Options: Prop, Regs. On Parlne"hip Options Take a 'Friendly' slant. 70 
Practical Tax Strategies 28 I (May 2003) (hereinafter "'Upton & McDonald"), 
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open transaction for the issuer (while outside the scope of Section 721). 
The option holder is seen as having made a capital expenditure to acquire 
an option that is neither taxable to the partnership nor deductible to the 
holder. The proposed regulations never explicitly state this, however, though 
there is language in the preamble and in an example to this effect. '7 While 
it is probably clear enough, an explicit statement in the proposed regula-
tions (as opposed to just ihe preamble) would be preferable." 
The proposed regulations note that under general rules of laxation, if 
the holder exchanges property for the option, there has been a taxable 
disposition of the propel1y. Gain or loss is recognized. '9 This conclusion 
is not entirely inescapable. One could argue that following the general 
open transaction system applicable to options, the transaction should be 
held open until it is known whether the option will be exercised or not. If 
not, gain or loss should be recognized on the property transferred for the 
option. If the option is exercised, Section 721 should apply to give tax free 
treatment to the contribution of the property to the partnership. This ap-
proach definitely stretches current law, however. An option is in fact a 
prope11y interest, and Section 1001 requires gain or loss recognition when 
properties are exchanged barring a trumping IRe section. There is no code 
section that trnmps the property transfer by the option holder for the op-
tion. and therefore suggesting that Section 1001 does not require gain or 
loss recognition (again subject to the loss disallowance rules) requires a 
fai.r amouut of imagination. 
The proposed regulations provide limited coverage of the tax treat-
ment of a lapse of an option. The regulations themselves merely state the 
obvious: That a lapse is outside the scope of Section 721.'" It would have 
to be outside the scope of Section 721 inasmuch as the erstwhile option 
holder has not contributed property to the partnership in exchange for an 
interest in the partnership. The preamble t.o the proposed regulations then 
observes that, consistent with general tax principles, the lapse of a non-
compensatory option generally results in the recognition of income by the 
partnership and the recognition of loss by the former option holder. Under 
the general principles of Section 1234, there should be short term capital 
gain to the partnership in the amount equal to the option premium and a 
"Preamble; Prop. Reg. 1.721-2(0),(1) expo 
:s See ABA Comments, at rvB2 and ""Shop Talk, Court Gives Legal Effect to Pre-
amble to Proposed Regs'," 80 J. Tax'n (January 1994). 
1<; Prop, Reg_ L72J-2(b); there are nnmerous loss disallDwance rules in the Code. 
One example are the pa~bive (oss rules of IRe 469 which usually disallow passive lo~se~ 
to the extent the taxpayer does not have sufficient offsetting passi ve income. 
lC Prop. Reg. 1.721·2(c). 
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(Iypically capital) loss of the same amount to the option holder.21 While 
admittedly it would be doing no more than restating current law, for sake 
of completeness it would be helpful if the regulations contained a section 
on lapses, including an example, 
The proposed regulations generally apply Section 721 to the exer-
cise of the option, making it a nontaxahle transaction to the partners and 
the partnership. The option holder is viewed as contributing money or 
property in the form of the exercise price and option privilege to the part-
nership and receiving a partnership interest in exchange?" Thus, if in the 
exercise of the option the option holder transfers property to the partner-
ship, no gain or loss is recognized to the option holder or the partnership. 
The prutnership takes a carryover basis in any contributed property under 
Section 723, The option holder takes a substituted basis in the partnership 
interest under Section 722, 
The proposed regulations make good sense to this point. TIley are 
consistent with the general option rules of Section 1234 as well the rules 
for the exercise of option to acquire stock in a corporation." The reality is 
that the issuance of an option is an open transaction in fact. Usually it is 
unknown at the time of issuance what will ultimately occur, whether the 
option will be exercised, or allowed to lapse. Under these circumstances it 
makes sense to hold the transaction open until all the facts are in, These 
considerations led to the Service ruling in favor of open transaction stalus 
for options long ago" and to Section 1234, and it only made sense for the 
Service to respect that history in promulgating the proposed regulations, 
The proposed regulations contain some highly important rules for 
computing capital accounts. An option holder, not being a partner, has no 
capital account25 When the option holder becomes a partner upon exer-
cise of the option, the option holder's initial capital account is equal to the 
option premium and option exercise price paid, including the fair market 
2~ See disclission of hnckground supra. 
The proposed regulations do not discuss the tax consequences l~f a right to cou-
vert partnershjp debt into an interest in the issuing partnership [0 the extent of any ac~ 
crued but unpaid interest on the debt. The- drafters felt there were arguments for and 
against income recognition at this point, and inasmuch as the area was: closely related to 
the tax treatment of compensatory options, it deferred addre~sing the issue until the com-
pensatory regulations are i".'med. See preamble. 
::.1 See Section 1032\a). 
24 See Rev. Ruls. 58-234 and 78·l82; for an opposing view see Kwall, "Out \vith the 
Open-Tran&actlon Doctrine: A new Theory for Taxing Contingent Payment Sales," 81 
N.C. Law Rev. ~77 (20m). 
25111is assumes the option holder does nol abo hold a partnership interc&t. It also 
a~sumes the recharacterization rules di~cu<;sed later in the article do not apply. 
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value of any contributed property." Typically, the value of the partnership 
interest reeei ved wi II be different from the total amount paid by the option 
holder. Of course, what commonly induces an option holder to exercise an 
option is the belief that what she is receiving is worth more than what she 
is paying. This means that the option privilege itself has value inherent in 
it Since the option exercise is a nontaxable event, the gain is not recog-
nized on exercise (neither wou ld be the loss in the less likely event the 
option holder exercises the option even though the exercise price exceeds 
the value of the option). In principle, the option privilege is an asset with 
built-in gain or Joss that should be allocated to the option holder under 
Section 704(c),27 The difficulty is that the option plivilege is not truly 
contributed to the partnership, hut rather disappears on exercise. Accord-
ingly, the value of the option privilege itself does not increase the capital 
account. To get to the right result, the proposed regulations generally sub-
stitute gain or loss inherent in the partnership'S assets for gain or loss in-
herent in the option privilege." This is done by first requiring the 
partnership to revalue its property immediately after the exercise of the 
option. Allowable revaluations have to date been optional. Under the pro-
posed regulations, however, revaluations in this context are mandatory.'" 
Any unrealized gain or loss from the revaluatinn is first allocated to the 
option holder to the extent necessary to reflect the hoJder's right to share 
"Prop. Reg. 1.704-1(2)(iv)(d)(4J; with respect to convertible equity, the fair mar-
ket value of the property contributed to the parlnership on the exercise of the option 
include~ the convening partner's capital account immediately before the conversion. 
'Vith respect tv convertible debt, the fair market value of the properlY contributed on the 
exercise of the option includes the adjusted basis ancllhe accrued but unpaid qualifled 
stated interest on the debt ixnmedjatcly before the conversion. 
n To gros~ly oven,jrnpliCy, Se>.:tlofl 704(c) requires tax gain or los!> inherent in con-
tributed assets to be allocated to the contributing partner. Under the Section 704{c) rcgu-
lation~, Lhree methods can be u~ed 10 do this: The "traditional method:1 the 'traditional 
rncrhod v .. ith curative allocations," and the "remedial method." The tax impact of the 
three methods can vary dramatically. See Reg. j .704-3. 
23 See Lipton and McDonald, fl. 16 supra. 
'" Prop. Reg. 1.704-1 (b)(2)liv)(s)(I). A "revaluation" restate, the property and tbe 
capital accounts of the partnerj-j at rair market value. The lax basis jn the property is 
unaffected and there is no tax con.:;equence to the l't"vaJuatiotl. A thorough discusslon is 
beyond the scope of thIS article, but revaluations are only allowed in -:ertain circum-
stances including on contributions in exchange for a partner<;hip interest or distributions 
in ex-:hange for a partnership interel>L Once a I'entluadon is made, Section 7D4(c) prin-
ciples have to be followed 1n allocating the tax In this context. except to the extent 
tax gain or loss i~ allm:abh: to the option holder under the proposed regulations, .any tax 
gain or loss inberent in the asse.ts at the time of the revaluation must be allocated to the 
continuing pa.rtners based on the shares they \vQuld have received had the partnership 
properties been sold at the time of the revaluation. See Reg. 1.704, l(b)(2)(iv)(f) and n. 27 
supra, Under those regulatlon::. the revaluation occurs before the triggering c.vent, but under 
the profX-)Sed regulatlons the revaluation occurs following the exercise of the option. 
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in partnership capital under the partnership agreement. Thereafter the gain 
or loss is allocated to the historic partners to reflect the manner in which 
the gain or loss would be allocated among them if there were a taxable 
disposition of the partnership property.'" Section 704(c) principles are then 
used to make sure that tax gain or loss is allocated properly." This is 
perhaps easiest to understand by way of an example, 
Example 1. In Year I, Lilly and Cleo each contribute cash of $10,000 to 
LLC, a newly formed limited liability company (that is a tax partnership) 
in exchange for 100 units in LLC. Under the LLC agreement, each unit is 
entitled to participate equally in the profits and losses of LLC. LLC uses 
the cash contributions to purchase a non-depreciable property. Property A. 
for 520,000. Also in Year I, at a time when Property A is still valued at 
$20,000, LLC issues an option to Bonnie, The option allows Bonnie to 
buy 100 units in LLC for an exercise price of $15,000 in Year 2, Bonnie 
pays S 1,000 to the LLC for the i"mance of the option, In Year 2, Bonnie 
exercises the option, contributing the $15,000 exercise price to LLC. At 
the time the option is exercised, the value of Property A is $35,000.12 
Liahilities and Cupital 
Bonnie's tax basis in the partnership interest is $16.000. the total amount 
she invested, Bonnie's capital account initially is credited by $16,000 with 
the amount paid for the option ($1,000) and the exercise price of the op-
tion ($15,000), Underthe LLC agreement, however, Bonnie is entitled to 
LLC capital corresponding to 100 units of LLC (i/3 of LLC's capital), 
Immediately after the exercise of the option, LLC's assets are cash of 
$16,000 and Property A, which has a value of $35,000. Thus, the total 
value of LLC's assets is $51,000. Bonnie is entitled to LLC capital equal 
to lI3 of this value, or $17.000. 
," Prop, Reg. 1.704-1 (b )(2)(1v)(,)( I ),(2), 
,; See n 27 ;;upra. 
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Thus, Bonnie is entitled to S 1 ,000 more LLC capital than her capital 
contributions to LLC. Under the proposed regulations, LLC must increase 
Bonnie's capital account from $16,()00 to $17,000 by, first, revaluing LLC 
property and allocating the first $1,000 of book gain to Bonnie.33 
The net "book" gain inherent in LLC's assets (Property A) is $15,000 
($35,000 value less $20,000 basis). The first Sl ,000 of this gain must be 
allocated to Bonnie, and the remaining $14,000 of this gain is allocated 
equaJly to Lilly and Cleo in accordance witb the LLC agreement. These 
capital account adjustments have no immediate tax impact. Note that all of 
the partners, including Bonnie, are allocated their fair shares of the book gain. 
Some of the book gain is allocable to Bonnie because it economically be-
longed to her due to the increase in the value of her option privilege. 
After the smoke clears, the tax and book account are as follows: 
Lilly 
TuX Book 
: Beg Cup 110.000 L:_~,OOQ 
ReVdlulllion ! 7.0()O 

















The disparity between the tax and book accounts must be allocated 
in accordance with Section 704(c) principles.'" 
Non-Straightforward Exercise 
New Partner Enters While Option Outstanding 
The proposed regulations provide rules for doing the revaluation math if a 
new partner enters the partnership while an option is outstanding." The 
fair market value of partnership property is adjusted for any outstanding 
options. There are two components to the adjustment. 
Thefirs{ component: The fair market value of partnership property is reduced 
by the option premium paid 10 the partnership.1f. This reduction occurs because 
:13 See n. 24 supra. 
14 Soc n. 27 SUPf" and Reg. 1,704, I (b)(2)(iv)(s)(1),(2); in this context thi, means 
that of the $15,000 of tax gain, $7,000 each must be allocated to LiBy and Cleo and 
$1 ,000 mu~t be allocated to Bonnie, i.e, the tax gain effectively earned by them, 
'5 Logically these rule~ ,>hould apply even if a ne"v partner i}; not entering the parl-
nerRhip but the partnership interest" change dw,~ to additional capital contributions from 
some of the existing partners while an option is out~tanding. 
"Prop, Reg. L704-1(b)(2)(iv)([j,Il. 
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the value oflhe option premium in a sense belongs to the option holder. and he 
will be able to increase his capital account by the amount oflhe premium if he 
exerdscs the option. 
The second component: If the fair market value of the outstanding option 
exceeds the premium paid by the option holder. then the fair market value of 
partnership property is reduced by the eXce,,,"s to the extent of unreal1L!~d income 
or gain in partnership property that has not previously been reflected in the 
capital account!). The reduction is anocated only to properties \vith unrealized 
appreciation in proportion to their respective amount:. of unrealized 
appreciation. Thil'\ adjustment insures that gnin economically attributable to 
the option holder is not allocared to the partner~. (f the optIon premium paid by 
the "ption holder exceeds the fair market value oflhe option, then the value of 
partnership property is increased by that excess to the extent of the unreal ized 
deduction or lo~s in partnership property not previously r.::f]ected in the capital 
accounts, The increaSe is allocated only to properties \vith unrealized 
depreciation in proportion to their respective amounts of unrealized 
depreciation.'l: This adjustment insures that a loss economically attributable to 
the option holder is not allocated to the part"e,",. If the option ultimately lapses. 
as would be likely where the value of what is to be received is leSs. than the 
option exercise price, Section 1234 will trigger short term capital gain to the 
partnerl.,hip in the amount of the option premiurn and a corresponding Joss to 
the option holder. At that point the adjustments discussed above would no 
longer he appropriate. The proposed regulations do not address this issue. but 
presumably the partnership would have to await a subsequent revaluation to 
get the numbers right again. 
Example 2. In Year I. Lilly and Cleo each contribute cash of $10.000 to 
LLC, a newly formed limited liability company that is a tax partnership, in 
exchange for 100 units in LLC LLC uses the cash to purchase two nonde-
preciable properties, Property A and Property B, for $10,000 each. Also in 
Year I, at a time when Property A and Property B are still valued at S 1O.OOll 
each. LLC issues an option to Bonnie for $1 ,000. The option allows Bonnie 
to buy 100 units in LLC for an exercise price of 515,OOll in Year 2.:" 
Prior to the exercise of Bonnie', option. Mati contributes S 17 ,000 
to LLC for 100 units in LLC. At the time of Matt's contribution, Property 
A has a value of $30,000 and a basis of SlO,OOO. Property B has a value of 
$5,000 and a basis of $10,000, and the fair market value of Bonnie's op-
tion is $2,00039 Upon Matt's admission to the partnership, the capital 
'7 Prop. Reg. J .71l4-I(b)(2)(iv)(fJiI ),(h)(2). 
J" This example is based on Prop. Reg. 1.704- j (bl(5) expo 22. 
v! Example 22 in the proposed regulations simply give thiii as a fact. Thi~ \viU be 
discussed in more detail belm\'" 
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accounts of Lilly and Cleo (which were $10,000 each prior to Matt's ad-
mission) are revalued, thus retlecting their shares of the unrealized appre-
ciation in the pannership's assets. 
Under the proposed regulations, the fair market value of partnership 
property ($36,000) must be reduced by the option premi urn paid by Bonnie 
to the partuership to acquire the option ($1,000) and the excess of the fair 
marker value of the option as of the date of the adjustment over the option 
premium paid by Bonnie to acquire the option ($1 ,000), but only to the extent 
of the unrealized appreciation in LLC ptoperty ($15,000). Therefore, the re-
valuation adjustments must be based on a value of $34,000 ($36,000 - $2,000). 
Accordingly, Lilly and Cleo's capital accounts must be increased to $17,000. 
111e second $1,000 reduction is attributable to the "profit" inherent in the op-
tion premium ("the second component") and is allocated entirely [0 Property 
A. the only asset having unrealized appreciation. Therefore. the book value of 
Property A is $29,000 ($30,000 $1,000),40 
Assets 
Tax B:~s.i;; FMV Oplion 
"",, 
I Property A 10.000 30.(XIO ' ( I.IX){)) : 29.000 
: Property B 10.000 5.000 
i 
5.000 
Cas;; 1.000 ! 1.000 ! 1.000 
Subtotal 12l.000 36.000 • (1,000) 35,000 
Matr;~ Cash 1 17,000 : 17JKI{) 0 17,()()O 
Total 138 .000 53.000 n,0001 52.00\) .. __ .... 
Liabilities and Capital 
Tax FMV 
L:Hy : 10,000 17.000 
Cleo 10.000 17,000 
--.. 
Man 17,000 17.0(1{) 
Bennie's Option !,OOO 2.000 
Total 3K,OOO 53.00i1 I 
4'J The $19,000 of built-in gain in Property A and the $5,000 ofbui1r-in loss in Prop-
erty B must be allocated equally between Lilly and Cleo in accordance with Section 
704(0) principles. Reg. l. 704·1(11)0 )(iv)(f)(4). 
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After Matt becomes a member, and when the property values are 
nnchanged, Bonnie exercises the option. On the exercise of the option, 
Bonnie's capital account is credited with the amount paid for the option 
($1.000) and the exercise price of the option ($15,000). Under the LLC 
agreement, however, Bonnie is entitled to LLC capital corresponding to 
100 units ofLLC (1/4 ofLLe's capital). Immediately after the exercise of 
the option, LLC's assets are worth 568,000 ($15,000 contributed by Bonnie, 
plus the value of LLC assets prior to the exercise of the option, $53,000). 
Bonnie is entitled to LLC capital equal to 114 of this value, or $17,000. As 
discussed above, the proposed regulations require a revaluation and capi-
tal account adjustments at this stage. 
The LLC must increase Bonnie's capital account from $16,000 to 
$17,000 by, first, revaluing LLC property and allocating the fir&t $1,000 
of book gain to Bonnie. The net increase in the value of LLC properties 
since the previous revaluation is $1 ,000 (the difference between the actual 
value of Propelty A, $30,000, and the book value of Property A, $29,000). 






End Cap, 10,000 
Matt Bonnie 
Tax Book Ta.'.; Book 
: Cap. POM Malt ! IO.DOa 17.0DD 
I 
I 




• i ;,000 
End Cap. I 17.000 17.()(H] 116.0D() [7.000 
Obviously, these mle, are highly complex. They accomplish one very 
useful objective. They hold out of the capital account adjustments the ap-
preciation (and less importantly depreciation) attributable to the outstand-
41 Again. IRe 704(c) principles. must be fol1O\ve.d in allocating tax gain and loss. 
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ing option, as well as the option premium itself. If this were not done, the 
capital accounts of the continuing partners and entering partners would 
tend to be overstated upon a revaluation, assuming the partnership prop-
erty had appreciated while the option was outstanding. That is because 
some of the increased value of the property would really "belong" to the 
option holder who would be allocated it as soon as the option was exer-
cised. Moreover, the more appreciation there would be, the more likely it 
would be that the option would be exercised, making it increasingly point-
less to allocate the appreciation to anyone other than the option holder. 
Further, if the option is ignored in these circumstances and upon a revalu-
ation (while the option is outstanding) all of the value is allocated to the 
new and existing partners_ when the option is exercised and a revaluation 
is again done, a portion of the capital accounts of the existing partners 
would have to be allocated to the option holder/partner. Prior to the pro-
mulgation of the proposed regulations, the concern would have been that 
capital shift could be seen as a taxable transfer of the associated partner-
ship property by the eKisting partners to the option holder under Section 
1001.42 Yet economically, the relevant gain belonged to the option holder 
all along. Tbe proposed regulations solve this problem by pulling tbe ap-
preciation attributable to the option holder-as well as the option premium-
out of the revaluation equation (though the issue arises again for curative 
allocations, as I discuss below). 
There is one practical problem with the approach of the proposed 
regulations. When doing a revaluation, both the proposed regulations and 
the existing regulations" require the partnership to restate the book val-
ues of the partnership properties at their fair market at the time of the 
revaluation, The capital accounts of the partners are in turn also restated to 
their fair market values, that is what partner, would generally receive if 
the partnership were liquidated:! The practical prohlem is that the values 
of the partnership properties in real life in most instances will not be know-
able with precision without going to the often great expense of an ap-
praisal. In most cases that wiil not be an economically viable option. 
Partnerships, when doing revaluations, commonly do not attempt to 
independently determine ti,e fair market values of the partnership proper-
ties. Rather, they "rever,e engineer" the value of the partnership proper-
ties based on the value of the cash andlor property contributed by the new 
42 For example. a 10% capf1a] shift could be seen,as a taxable transfer of J 0% of the 
partnership property from the continuing partners to the new partners. though there is no 
authority directly on point. See McDougal v. Comm'r, 62 TC 720 (1974) and Schwidetzky 
l,n.3supra,at 111-113. 
," See Reg L7U4 .. I(b)(2)(iv)(t). 
c, See Reg. U04-I(b)(2)(iv)(b), 
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partner and the percentage interest that partner will have in the partner-
ship. Thus, if an entering paJtner pays $10,000 for a 10% interest, it is as-
sumed that the partnership property (inclusive of the $10,0(0) is worth 
$100,000. Thus, ultimmely the revaluation is not based on the value of the 
partnership property but on the value of the partnership interest being acquired.45 
Typically, a reverse-engineered revaluation will yield book values of 
partnership properties that are less than the amount for which they could 
be sold and capital aecounts that are less than the liquidation value of the 
partnership interest. This is because an incoming partner will otten dis-
count what he will pay for the partnership interest to take into account 
economic realities. These realities could include the facts that the interest 
is not marketable, that it represents a minority intere:,t in the enterprise, 
and therefore does not have control, andlor other relevant discounting con-
siderations.46 Thus in the example above, wbere the entering partner paid 
$10,000 for a 10% partnership interest, the actual value of the partnership 
property on a sale might be $120,000, but the entering partner might have 
discounted the value by 20% to take into account the lack of marketability 
and the fact that he is receiving a minority interest. 
It would be best if both the existing and proposed regulations were 
amended to take this real-world approach into account. If it is not done 
and a partnership (perhaps foolishly given the low risk of audit) wanted to 
comply literally with the regulations, the results \vould be anomalous. In 
the example, upon the revaluation the entering partner arguably could be 
given a capital account of $12.000 notwithstanding the fact he only paid 
$lO,ooO, which in addition to being aesthetically unpleasing, will cause a 
lot of confusion. Taxpayers will wonder why their capital accounts are 
different than their contribution, and many legal and accounting advisors 
will not understand the rules and make the capital acconnt $lO,I){)O re-
gardless. Further, there is no real harm done by formally permitting the 
real-world approach as everything will come out in the wash on an actual 
liquidation. The regulations require the partnership to recognize any book 
gain or loss inherent in the assets at that time."' Without a regulatory au-
thorization, however, a less than wise IRS auditor might claim the partner-
ship is not keeping capital accounts properly and launch a full-blown attack 
4.'\ See ABA Comments, at IVD2; thil\ approach is most \'i.'QTkahle \vhere a straight 
percentage is acquired. However, often a partner does not acqujrc a "10% interest," bUl 
instead an interest that varies depending on partnership performance. 
46 There is ample case law supporting the use of discountf;. See, e.g., Gross v. Comm 'r, 
272 F.3d 333 (6" Cir. 20OJ); Church v, Comm'r, 268 F,3d 1063 (5" eiL 200]); Estate of 
Strangi v. Comm·r. 115 TC 478 (lOOO). afCd in part 8lld rev'd in parr 293 F.3d 279 (5'" Cit. 
20(2), on remand TCM 2003-l45. Some times a premium is paid for "going concern value." 
Reg. 1.704-1 (b)(2)(iv)(c)(I). This ruiealso requires hook gain or 10<$ to be recog-
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on an otherwise allowable allocation regime," Further. it would create 
disjunctures with other rules. If the new partner gifts the interest, the gift 
will have a value of $10,000, not the .$12,000 in the capital account The 
same is true with regard to the amount realized on a sale. 
The proposed regulations are internally inconsistent and do not base 
capital accounts on liquidation values in one important respect. As I dis-
cuss in the above examples, in calculating the capital accounts of the pmt-
ncrs in the case of a new partner entering the partnersbip while an option 
is outstanding, an adjustment is made for the "fair market value" of the 
outstanding option.49 That fair markel value is presumably the value an 
independent third party would pay for the option, not the "liquidation profit" 
that would be generated if the option were exercised and the partnership 
were immediately liquidated. 51l Using the actual fair market value of the 
option can create unnecessary problems with the corrective allocations 
rules (that r discuss immediately below). By using the fair market value 
rather than liquidation profit to value the outstanding option, the proposed 
regulations will tend 10 overstate the capital accounts of the existing part-
ners. This is because the fair market value of the option will likely be less 
than the liquidation profit due to economic realities associated with mi-
nority interests, lack of marketability, and other factors, considerations the 
proposed regulations otherwise ignore, When the option is exercised, if 
the continuing partners have overstated capital accounts, the option holder! 
partner will need a larger capital account than would otherwise be the 
ease, increasing the chance that a corrective allocation will be necessary, 
This problem is mooted if my recommendation is [oj lowed that the 
corrective allocation rules not be adopted, Still, for sake of consistency, 
flexibility, and real world realities, it wonld be preferable if the proposed 
regulations gave the partnership a choice. This unfortunately will compli-
cate the regu lations somewhat as there will need to be two regimes, but 
alas the alternative ofleaving things they way they are creates Jarger prob-
lems. Either the partnership revalues using the actual values of the part-
nership properties and then the liquidation profit for the option or reverse 
engineers using the capital contribution of the entering partner, in which 
case it would be appropriate to use the actual fair market value of the 
option, It would not be appropriate to jump back and forth between the 
two systems as that would permit unduly easy manipUlation of capital 
acconnt balances, Case law suggests that the choice between the two sys-
tems would be a choice of an accounting method. A partnership is re-
of:> In order to meet the "sub!;tantiaJ economic effect" ~afe harbor for allocations of 
income and loss among the partners. capital accounts. must be maintained a., provided in 
the regulation" Regs. L704-1(b)(2)(ii)(b). -I (b)(2l(iv)(b), 
'" Prop. Reg, l,7()4-J (b)(2)(iv)(f)(l),(h)(2), 
In Prop, Reg, L704-1(b)(5) exp, 22, the proposed regulations assume the fair 
market value of the option is equal to the Jiqmda1jon profit. but in real life that will not 
necessariJy be the casco 
PROPOSED REGULATIONS ON NONCOMPENSATORY OPTIONS 171 
quired to be cOllsistent in its lise of accounting systems," and that rule 
should prevent partnerships from alternating between the two systems. It 
would be best, however, if the final regulations stated this explicitly. 
Corrective Allocations 
In some cases the built in gain or loss in the option will exceed the unreal-
ized appreciation or depreciation in the partnership's assets. As 11 conse-
quence, 11 disparity will remain after all of the unrealized appreciation or 
depreciation in the partnership's assets has been allocated to the option 
holder after the revaluation. In this case the proposed regulations still shift 
capital between the historic partners and the option holder so that the op-
tion holder has the economically correct capital account balance. In a con-
troversial move the proposed regulations require the partnership to make 
corrective allocations of gross income or loss to the partners so as to take 
into account this disparity.'? This can mean, for example, that the option 
holder will incur taxable income on exercise of the option. Allocations 
under the partnership agreement will not be considered to have substantial 
economic effect, unless the agreement complies with these rules.5.l 
Example 3, Assume the same facts as in Example I, except that, in Year 1, 
LLC sells Property A for $40,000. recognizing gain of $20,000. LLC does 
not distribute the sale proceeds to its panners and it has no other eamings 
in Year 1. With the proceeds ($40,000), LLC purchases Property B, a non-
depreciable propeny. Also assume that Bonnie exercises the option at the 
beginning of Year 2 and that, at the time Bonnie exercises the option, the 
value of Property B is $41 ,000. In Year 2, LLC has gross income ofS3,000 
and deductions of $1,500." 
Asc:cts Liabilitie:-. allt] Capital 
l3a~i;; PMY Ba.~is FMV 
41.000 Lilly 20.000 19,O()() 
16,Of.XJ Cleo 20,000 19.000 
Bunnie 16.000 19,000 
57,()(KI 56.000 5!.OOI) 
\l See Bank One Corporal ion v. Comm'f, 120 TC No. II (2003) and Reg. 1.446-
1 (a): a thanks gOtH to Paul ern'man, Esq. of Chapman and Cutler for pointing out the 
accounting system mles. 
i2 Prop. Reg. 1.704-1(b)(2)(1v)(s)(3). 
5,< Prop. Reg, 1.704 .. I (b)(2)(iv)(s}(3)(ix). Meeting the "substantial economic elIeet" 
test can be cruciaL To meet the regUlatory safe harbor for allocation;; of partnership 
income or loss. they must have "substantial economic effecL" Reg. t 704-l(bj(l}(i), 
"This example is based on Prop. Reg. 1.704-1 (b}(5) ex. 21. 
, , 
" " , 
, :. 
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Bonnie's capital account is credited with the amount paid for the 
option ($1,000) and the exercise price of the option (SI5,000). Under the 
LLC agreement however, Bonnie is entitled to LLC capital correspond-
ing to 100 units ofLLC (113 ofLLC's capital). Immediately after the exer~ 
eise of the option, LLC's assets are $16,000 cash and Property E, which 
has a value of 841,000. Thus, the total value of LLC's assets is $57,000. 
Bonnie is entitled to LLC capital equal to 113 of this amount. or 519,000. 
Bonnie is thus entitled to $3,000 more LLC capital than her capital contri-
butions to LLC. 
Cnder the proposed regulations. LLC must increase Bonnie's capital 
account from S 16,000 to $19,000. First. LLC revalues its property, allo-
cating the SI,OOO of book gain from the revaluation to Bonnie. This brings 
Bonnie's capital account to $17,000. There being no other book gain avail-
able, LtC must now reallocate $2,000 of capital from Lilly and Cleo to 
Bonnie to bring Bonnie's capital account to $19,000 (the capital account 
reallocation). As Lilly and Cleo have equal shares, each of their capital 
accounts is reduced by half of the $2,000 reduction, $1,000 each." 
Beginning in the year in which the option is exercised, LLC must 
make corrective allocations sO as to take into account the capital account 
reallocation. In Year 2, LLC has gross income of $3,000 and deductions of 
$1,500. The book gross income of $3,000 is shared equally by Lilly, Cleo, 
and Bonnie. For tax purposes, however, tLC must allocate all of its gross 
income ($3,000) to Bonnie. Her nonnal share would have been one-third or 
$1,000. The extra $2,000 of income "offset," the $2,000 allocated to her capi-
tal account. According to the proposed regulations, LLC's book and tax de-
ductions ($1,500) are allocated equally among Lilly_ Cleo, and Bonnie.56 
There is a connie! of sorts in the proposed regulations between tbe 
descriptive language of the regulation and the provisions in the example. The 
fOlmer provide that a colTective allocation is an allocation of "gross income 
and gain, or gross loss and deduction, that differs from the partnership's allo~ 
cation of the COlTesponding book item."'7 The example provides for the allo-
cation of income only. The regulatory language suggests losses could be used 
instead (for example. by depriving Bonnie of her share of tax losses), or a 
combination of income and losses could be used. If the final regulations 
,\~ Since [he proposed regulations attach no tax consequence to this :;tage, the impli-
cati()n is that fbi:'} capital shift it;.elf does not \~onstilute a tuxable event. Since many 
believe capitaJ shifts to generally be taxable events, i:ffi explicit statement a~ to jt~ non·· 
taxable nature would he preterable. See letter to Commissioner from the Federal Taxa-
tion Committee of the Chicago BarA~sociatjon dates July 22, 2003 (hereinafter "Chicago 
Bar Letter"); Ree discussi('o of background supra. 
% ;";ote that there are still book/tax disparities meaning that future tax items from 
Properly B must still be allocated in accordance with Sect10n 704(c) principles. 
Prop. Reg. [,704 1 (b)(4)(x). 
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Book Tux Book 
~------.. -----~ .... -
I ! 
I cap acn : 





~~t~~ttt. 20.00{! 20,000 20J)OO 20.000 10.0\10 reval. 
re,dloc" (l,OIX}) (1.000) 




20,000 19.000 20.000 19,000 16.000 
ai\e-t rcall. 
inc. aHoca. J,OnO 1.IIOn 3,()OO 
Jed. ~,:Io{;~\. 500 5(Xl 500 500 SIX} , 
capital <li;ct 19,500 19,5IX) I 950(} 1:1.500 J~.5(X) 










should stick with the corrective allocation approach (with which, as dis-
cussed below, I would disagree), they should clarify whether the partner-
ship has the discretion to allocate income or losses or whether the 
partnership has to follow a set procedure.'" The former would generally 
seem preferable as it would make it more likely that the partnership could 
remedy some of the character mismatching that can occur (discm,sed be-
low), give the partnership more flexibility in addressing corrective alloca-
tions, and at least in partnerships with unrelated partners would not seem 
likely to lead to abuse. The conective allocation approach of the proposed 
regulations likely does not match the typical option holder's expectation". 
Outside the entity context, if an option holder exercises a call option, it is 
precisely hecause there has been appreciation in the asset subject to the 
option. The fisc does not tax the option holder on it until the underlying 
property is sold. In the examples, the option holder's option is to purchase 
the partnership interest. There has been no disposition of it and under tra-
ditional option principles it would seem premature to generate income 
recognition. The problem with this perspective is that a partnership inter .. 
est does not truly represent a separate asset. Without once again beating to 
death entity versus aggregate arguments on partnership taxation,59 what 
makes the partnership interest worth more is what is going on inside the 
partnership, a flow-through entity. The appreciation in Property A occurred 
while Bonnie held the option, and due to the appreciation the option be-
came worth exercising. In a sense, given the existence and inevitability of 
5~ See ABA Comments, at lVB7, 
"WPPn. 16 ,upm. anI 1.04. 
." I. '" ,I , , 
',J .' 
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the exercise of Bonnie's option, when Property A was sold, Lilly and Cleo 
were taxed on Bonnie's share of the income. Accordingly, it makes some 
sense to find a way to tax Bonnie on that income when capital is shifted 
from Lilly and Cleo to Bonnie. The regulations accomplish this to some 
degree. They also expedite matching tax and book aecounts, always a high 
priority in partnership taxation. Further, by shifting taxable income (but 
not book income) to Bonnie, Lilly and Cleo get the equivalent of a tax 
loss, appropriately offsetting the "extra" tax gain they received on dispo-
sition of the property. 
The corrective allocation approach of the proposed regulations cre-
ates some problems, however. One is a potential character mismatch. Con-
tinuing with the example, the gain from the sale of Property A commonly 
would be capital or 1231 gain, whereas the income allocated to Bonnie 
typically would be ordinary income. This may give Lilly and Cleo an op-
portunity for tax arbitrage. They recognize capital gain on the sale of the 
Property A, pay tax on the gain at preferential rate, (typically 15%), and 
then receive the equivalent of an offsetting ordinary tax loss when a por-
tion of pannership income is allocated to Bonnie (reducing taxable in-
come that can be taxed at up to a 35% rate). Under the right circumstances, 
Lilly and Cleo will actually be motivated to sell property while an option 
is outstanding. Given the near-term tax impact, Bonnie will probably see 
the option as worth less and will be less likely to exercise the option.',l) 
Alternatively, Bonnie might cooperate with the tax arbitrage for Lilly and 
Cleo if she is tax-indifferent due, for example, to the fact that she has a net 
operating loss carry over.61 
Further. a corrective allocation can be triggered even when the part-
nership has not sold propeny while the option was outstanding. 
Example 4, Year I: Lilly and Cleo form a LLC by contributing S 1000 
each. LLC purchases unimproved land (the "Property") for $2,000 and 
grants to Bonnie for $100 an Option to acquire an interest in LLC. This 
(,II The ABA Comments. at IVB7 note that the corrective allocation approach of the 
propmed regulations further exagge-ratc-s the differences with Ihe \~/ay- options are treated 
in the corporate context, \-vhere there are no corrective allocation. \VhiJc there may be 
"orne arguments for greater consistency between the two regimes, at lc.ast '>lith regard to 
c~corporation~ the difference can he. justified. <>corporations are nOl ilo\l,Hhrough enti-
tie'i. and thu~ an option to acquire ;.;tock really is an option to acquire an asset that is. hest 
seen as independem of the internal workingt; of the corporation. or (;()urse. v,:hat goes Oil 
inside tile corporation nffect~ the value (If the stock, but thi:-: seems more akin to general 
e>.:onumic condWons affecting the value of nonentity related call options for property 
and less akin to call options for intere<;r" in flow through cntitic~, 
U Sec ABA Comments, at rVB7. A tax exempt entity \vouJd not necessarily be tax 
indHIercnt. That is because income from a typiad busine.':>s pmtnership would be unrelated 
businc;)::. taxuble income and thus taxable to the tax exempt. See Sections 511 and 512. 
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option entities Bonnie to no voting rights and a one-third interest in the 
capital and profits ofLLC for $567, A one-third interest based on the value 
of the partnership assets should cost $900 assuming Bonnie gets credit for 
the option premium ($2000 + ($900 + S 100)/3= $1000). The "discount" is 
due to the facts that Bonnie will be a minority partner without control over 
partnership affairs and will bold 3n interest that is not very marketable, 
LLC has no income or loss in year l.62 
Year 2: On January I, Bonnie exercises the Option at a time when the 
interest acquired has a fair market value of $667 (Bonnie's Option price 
plus Option premium). In that year LLC has no net income, $222 of gross 
income and $222 of deductions, The value of the Propert,y is unchanged at 
S2,000, Dnder the agreement BOllnie's share of partnership capital imme-
diately upon exercise is $889, one-third of the total capital of $2,667, Un-
der Prop. Reg. L704-1(b)(2)(iv)(s)(2), Bonnie's capital account includes 
the sum of (i) the Option premium. (ii) Option price paid and (iii) built-in 
gain to the extent necessary to produce a capital account equal to Bonnie's 
actual share of capital. Since there is no built-in gain, under the proposed 
regulations, Bonnie's capital account would initially consist of (i) the op-
tion premium and (ii) option price paid. or a total of $667, $222 less than 
her actual share of capital. 
Since there is no appreciation or depreciation in partnership assets, 
the proposed regulations require a capital account reallocation of $222 
from Lilly and Cleo's capital accounts to Bonnie's capital account, and 
since there is no book gain, a corrective allocation, Under these facts that 
will mean an allocation of $222 of ordinary, taxable income to Bonnie and 
an allocation of S III of tax deductions each to Lilly and Cleo, 
This result makes no sense, There has been no appreciation in the 
asset. 'There is an economic gain inherent in Bonnie's LLC interest that 
could only be recognized if the LLC liquidates, If Bonnie sells the interest 
to another, presumably the same discounting will apply and the interest will 
still have a value of $667, A corrective allocation would cause Bonnie's tax 
basis to exceed the fair market value of her interest. Further, Lilly and Cleo are 
effectively allocated tax losses where they have had no economic losses. 
Thus. while with corrective allocations of the proposed regulations 
address a legitimate concern, the cure may often be worse than the dis-
ease, The complicated nature of the corrective allocations will also mean 
that they will be a trap for the unwary, Many partnerships will lack the 
sophistication to comply. The Service has indicated informally it docs not 
think con-ective allocations will be common even under the regime of the 
proposed regulations. Given its complexity and the problems it can create. 
&2 Tbis example iR taken (in parts verbatim) from the ABA Comments, at IVB? 
, , 
'\ 
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if the problem is not going to be a common one, it is better to forgo the 
solution, at least as conceived by the proposed regulations. Accordingly, I 
suggest that the final regulations delete the corrective allocation rules. This 
may mean that the continuing partners have "extra income" and the option 
holder avoids some income, but this will normally be resolved on liquida-
tion of the interests. Often partnership agreements provide that al locations 
of income and loss will be made so that a partner's capital account equals 
the amount distributed to that partner. Admittedly. waiting until liquida-
tion to resolve the matter can mean a significant deferral for the option 
holder/partner, but as I discussed, and as Example 4 shows, using correc-
tive allocations can mean allocating income to the option holder when that 
is not appropriate{" Further there are other rules, in particular the 
recharacterization rules discussed below, to deal with truly abusive situa-
tions. If giving up on the corrective allocation rules entirely is more than 
the Service can stomach, the Service can replace the con-ective allocation 
rule with a nan-owly defined anti-abuse rule. allowing the Service to re-
quire corrective allocations when an active abuse is taking place. 
Option Holder Treated as Partner 
Generally. the proposed regulations treat an option as such and nQt as a 
partnership interest. Accordingly, the proposed regulations do not normally 
require the partnership to take an outstanding option into account when 
making partnership allocations of income and loss. There arc exceptions, 
however, and they are necessary. If every option were blindly respected, it 
would be easy for high-bracket taxpayers to avoid pmtnership income while 
effectively owning an interest in the partnership. Rather than acquire a 
partnership interest, they would buy an option. The terms of the option 
and the partnership agreement can be writt.en so they fully benefit from 
partnership profits. The terms might provide that the partnership may not 
make distributions or, more likely. only make limited distributions to cover 
partner tax liabilities. Since the profits will mostly stay in partnership so-
lution, the option wiII increase in value, giving the option holder the bell-
efit of partnership income without being taxed on it. Down the road the 
option holder could even sell tbe option at a capital gain, which typically 
would only be taxed at a 15% rate rather than ordinary income rates of np 
to 35% on a partner's share of operating profits.64 fnrther, had the option 
holder sold a partnership interest instead of the option, Section 751 would 
({; Some have suggested relying on Section 704(c) and its regulalions in this context 
to get the capital accounts right. Sec Chicago Bar Letter, n. 55 supra. However, that \vil1 
not always be possible. In this example, there is no basjs for applying Seclion 704(c) 
since there is no book/tax disparity in the assets. 
(," Sections I (h), l(i)(2). 
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have required him to recognize ordinary income to the extent of ordinary 
income inherent in partnership receivables and inventory."' Even before 
the proposed regulations, the Service has ruled and the courts have held 
that under the right facts options can be viewed as ownership interests. 
The proposed regulations would have fallen far short if they had not ad-
dressed this issue.'" 
The proposed regulations treat an option holder as a partner if two 
tcsts are meL TIlc option holder's rights must be substantially similar to 
the rights afforded a partner ("substantially similar test").") Additionally, 
as of the date that the option is issued. transferred, or modified, there must 
be a strong likelihood that the failure to treat the option holder as a partner 
would result in a wbstantial reduction in the present value of the partners' 
and the option holder's aggregate tax liabilities ("strong likelihood test").'" 
If an option is "reasonably celtain" to be exercised, then the holder 
of the option ordinarily has rights that are "substantially similar" to the 
rights afforded to a partner."" 
The proposed regulations list a series of factors that are relevant in 
determining whether or not an option is reasonably cettain to be exer-
cised. I generally do not find these lists helpful since they are nonexclu-
sive and consist of items that one would usually think of anyway-but 
nevertheless, here is the list: 
(i) Fair market value of the pill'tnership interest that is the ,ubject of 
the option; 
(ii) Exercise price of the option; 
(iii) Term of the option; 
(iv) Volatility, or riskiness, of the partnership interest that is the sub-
ject of the option; 
(v) Fact that the option premium and, if the option is exercised, the 
option exercise price, will become assets of the partnership; 
(.:$ This problem is to some extent offset by the fact that any purchaser of the option 
is likeJy to discount the price paid for the option for the aSBociated tax Section 75] t.-'lX 
liabilities he wiU be assuming on exercise of the option. Note that an lRC Section § 754 
election could nOl solve this problem if the option is respected as an option since there 
has been no sale OJ exchange of a partnership interest 
e<, Kw,tit v. Cumm'L TeN! 1989·382; Penn-Dixie, Steel Corp., 69TC 837 (1978); 
Rev. RuL 82-150,1982-2 CB 110; also see Grimn Paper ComplillY, TCY!1997-409, 
aff'd 180 F.Jd 272. 
61 Prop. Reg. 1.761-3(a), 
6_' These descriptl ve tl":rms are bono wed from the ABA Comments, at lVE 1. See 
Reg. 1.761 
,N Prop. Reg. 1.761-3(0)(1) 
: II 
! 







JOURNAL OF TAXATION OF INVESTMENTS 
Anticipated distributions by the partnership during the term of 
the option; 
Any other special option features, such as an exercise price that 
declines over time or declines contingent on the happening of 
specific events; 
Existence of related options, including reciprocal options; and 
Any other anangements (express or implied) affecting the likeli-
hood that the option will be exercised.?" 
The proposed regulations give some examples of when the rights 
given to an option holder do or do not cross the line to partner status. In 
one example an option holder pays $8 for a 7 -year option to acquire a 10% 
partnership interest for $17. The relevant partnership interest is worth $16 
at the time the option is issued. The business of the partnership is a risky 
one. Given the length of the term of the option and the facl that it is barely 
out of the money, the option holder is economically not very differently 
situated from a pmtner with a profits interest in the partnership. Under the 
facts, however, the option bolder does not have the same risk of loss as a 
partner. Further. the riskiness of the business means that the value of a 10% 
interest in 7 years is not reasonably predictable. For these reasons tbe pro-
posed regulations conclude that the option holder is not treated as a partner." 
In another example, a partnership owns rental property. The propcny 
is 95% rented to good quality corporate tenants on triple-net leases and is 
expected to remain so rented for 20 years. Occupancy rates are high in the 
relevant geographic area and it is expected to stay that way for 10 years. 
The option holder pays $6.50 for a 7-year option to acquire a 10% interest 
in the pmtnen;hip for $17. TIle value of 11 10% interest at the time of i&su-
ance of the option is $16.5. Net cash flow is reasonably expected to be S 10 
per year for the next 7 years. Finally no distributions are allowed to he 
made to the pmtners during that time. Under these assumptions, some of 
which require an unusually good crystal ball, the value of the option can 
be expected to go up in valne over the 7~year option term (as no distribu-
tions are heing made), and the value of the option can be expected to be 
greater than the option exercise price-and of course it can be expected that 
the option will be exercised. Cnderthese circnmstances, the option holder 
has rights substantially similar to the rights afforded a partner. If there is 
also a strong likelihood that failure to treat the option holder as a partner 
wonld result in a substantial rednction in the partners' and the option 




1.761-3(d)(2), Example I. 
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is in a high tax bracket and the partners in low tax brackets). the option 
holder will be treated as a partner?' 
Options that are deep in the money" raise similar issues. In one ex-
ample in the proposed regulations a limited partnership is engaged in a 
lisky internet start-up venture. (Is there any other kind?) The option holder 
pays $14 for an lO-year option to acquire a 5% interest for $6. A 5% inter-
est has a fair market value of$15 at the time the option is issued. Given the 
riskiness of the venture, it is not certain that the option will be exercised. 
but what the option holder has paid as a premium, $J 4, almost equals what 
the corresponding partnership interest currently is worth, $ I 5. Thus, if the 
business goes south, the option holder stands to lose almost as much as a 
partner. The option holder will also be able to participate the success of 
the partnership. Therefore. according to the proposed regulations, the op-
tion holder has similar economic benefits and detriments of a partner and 
therefore has rights similar to that afforded a partner. If there is a strong 
likelihood that the failure to treat the option holder as a partner would 
result in a substantial reduction in the partners' and the option holder's 
aggregate tax liabilities, the proposed regulations conclude that the option 
holder will be treated as a partner.'4 
If the option holder is considered to be a partner, he is allocated his 
share of partnership income or loss based on his interest in the partner-
ship. Computing his interest in the partnership is the hard part. The regula-
tions do not provide a lot of guidance in thi& regard beyond noting that an 
option holder may have contributed less than other partners, making his 
economic interest in the partnership smaller. Many ditlerent factors might 
go into calculating the allocable share. including the amount of the option 
premium paid, future rights to cun-em profits if they cannot be currently 
distributed, and rights on liquidations, if any. 
There are other complexities that can arise when an option holder is 
required to be treated as a partner. The biggest problems will occur when 
the partnership does not treat an option holder as a partner when it should 
have. Any audit that would detect the mistake will comes years after the 
fact. In the interim, the other partners may have inClLrred too much income 
while the option holder may have incurred too little. That will all have to 
be undone, assuming the statute of limitations has not expired on the per-
sonal tax returns of the partners." The problem gets worse if, for example. 
,. Prop. Reg. 1.761-3(<1)(2), Example 2. 
71 r"k:ming the cxcrci~e priceI' 1:, wel1 below the vallie of the partnership interest 
lhu\ will be acquired with the opliun. 
J4 Pl\)p. Reg. 1.761-3(d)(2). Example 3. 
~., The mitigati(lfl provisions of Section 1 J J 1- l:~ 14 may be rcle'v<:mt in thi.;,. regard, 
!. . 
:0 . : 
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the option holder is a tax exempt organization with a strong aversion to 
partner status and its associated unrelated business taxable income.'(; If 
any partners have come or gone during the involvement of ao option holder 
that should-have-been-treated-as-partner-but-was-not, the complexities of 
setting it all right reach Kafkaesque proportions. 
Those same problems exist in reverse if the optiou holder is treated 
as a partner only to discover he was not one. Another complication in this 
regard is if the option holder/partner who is considered a partner allows 
the option to lapse. Now what? Presumably it would be treated as an aban-
donment of the partnership interest, generating possible debt shifts and 
deemed cash distributions under Sections 752 ami 73 L basis adjustments 
under Section 734 if a Section 754 election is in elfect, and hot asset prob-
lems under Section 75 J.7' 
If thing,; run amok here, no one, least of all the IRS agent in the field, 
is likely to put Humpty Dumpty back together again. Accordingly, while 
the Service undoubtedly needs to address the possibility of abuse, it should 
do so in a manner that is narrowly designed to catch the abusers (and, 
more importantly, disconrage the potential ones). while leaving the rest of 
the tax world confident that it is free of the recharacterization ambit. The 
strong likelihood tests insure that only abusers will be drawn into the fold, 
but the rules as a whole do not insure that nonabusers will not be drawn in 
as well. The rules need some fine-tuning. 
Under the proposed regulations, for purposes of determining whether 
the. rights possessed by the option holder are substantially similar to those 
afforded partners, a key consideration with whether the option holder will 
share in the economic benefit of partnership profits and in the economic 
detriment associated with partnership losses. Also relevant is any arrange-
ment tbat allows the holder of an option to control or restrict partnership 
activities." The difficulty here is that to some extent most options meet 
the first two of these tests, and may meet all three tests.79 If the business 
does well. the option will become more valuable and the option holder 
will be likely to exercise the option, and thus the option will share the 
economic benet It of partnership protlts.lndeed, that is exactly what every 
75 1111S income is taxed to the tax exempt organi:;>::ation ut regular tax rates. See 
Section j I J, 512. 
77 See ABA Comment.s. at IVEl. 
iR RighB in the partnership posse~!-;ed by the option holder solely by virtue of own-
ing a partnership interest are not taken into account in this regard, provided those rights 
are not greater than the rights grumcd to other partners owning similar partnership inter-
ests: Prop Reg. \.761-3(0)(3). 
N See ABA Comments, at IVEle; also see Culbertson v. Camm'r. 337 U.S. 733 
(1949) and Luna '. Comm'r. 42 TC 1067 (1964). 
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option holder in or outside the partnership context hopes for. If the busi-
ness goes south, the option holder will likely not exercise the option and 
lose the value of his premium, thus to some extent sharing in the economic 
detriment associated with partnership losses. Admittedly, the maximum 
amount of loss is set by the premium. but that maximum may not be that 
different from losses likely to he incurred by partners. It is not unusual for 
partners, especially limited partners and LLC members. to have a maxi-
mum amount they can lose as welL Thus, all option holders will to some 
extent "share in the economic benefit of partnership profits and in the 
economic detriment associated with pannership losses." 
It is less common for option holders to have a major say in what the 
partnership can and cannot do. though economically strong option holders 
may have such right. If such rights exist, they will tend to be more indica· 
tive of partner status than the fact that an option holder ultimately shares 
in pannership profits and losses, but it should hardly by itself mean that 
the substantially similar test is met For example, all option holder might 
have the power to prevent the partnership from expanding beyond its ex-
isting lines of business. But if there is no intention to make such an expan-
sion, simply holding these veto rights would not seem sutlicient to meet 
the substantially similar test. A well~advised option holder may ask for a 
variety of protections that in and of themselves should not be fataL Ex~ 
amples include the right to veto admission of certain types of partners. 
which Section 704(c) method is used, 'u exit strategies and buy back rights, 
the rights of the option holder in the event of the sale of pannership assets, 
right to veto a sale of substantially all of the partnership assets, access to 
partnership books and other partnership information, compliance with fed-
eral and state securities laws, and limitations on the pannership's right to 
make distributions, and the manner in which they are made where no! 
completely prohibited." It would be impossible for the Service to provide 
a list of all acceptable or unacceptable righls that could be given to an 
option holder. Punher, rights that migbt be acceptable in some circum-
stances may become unacceptable in others. The examples give a better 
sense of things. but more guidance is needed. A solution would be for the 
regulations to exclude commercially reasonable provisions that look to 
hi Once a revaluation is madt\ allocations of tax items have to made in a manner that 
takes Section 704((;) into aCl~ounL This could mean, for example, tbut existing apprecia-
tion in partnership u!'sets has 10 be anocated to the cOlltinujng partners excepl to the 
extent the option regulations provide otherwise, L'nder the Section 704(c) regulations, 
three methods can be used to do this, the "traditional method." the "1:radilionaJ method 
with curative allocations:' and the "remedial method.-' The tax impact of the three meth-
ods can vary dramatically. See Reg, 1.704~3. 
~j Sec ABA Comments. at IVD2e. (Typically exi~ting pminel's wiH at least want to 
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protecting the option holder's investment in the option. This standard is 
hardly a model of precision, but it would be helpful to practitioners and is 
a large improvement on the current overly broad language that provides 
that partner attributes include the existence of any arrangement that di-
rectly or indirectly allows the holder of the option to control or restrict the 
activities of the partnership." The commercially reasonable standard adds 
some objectivity. The Service and taxpayers can look to the relevant in-
dustry to see what is in common usage. The regulations could also give 
examples of rights that do or do not cross the line. Thus. a right to veto 
entry into an improbable line of business might pass muster, but rights to 
regularly participate in management decisions would not. 
One of the most problematic areas in the rules is the fact that the 
option is tested to determine whether or not it constitutes a partnership 
interest each time the option is issued. transferred. or modified ("ITM 
event")."' Thus, not only is the option tested under the rules when it is 
issued, it is also tested upon a modification or transfer. It is not clear when 
a transaction qualifies as a moditication or transfer. Modifications to the 
terms of options are not uncommon. It is important that the final regula-
tions make clear what is a modification that triggers a recharacterization 
review and what is not, so that taxpayers have adequate guidance. This 
issue has arisen in other contexts. Regulation 1.1361-1 (1)(4 )(iii) considers 
whether an option should be classified as a second class of stock. One of 
the times the option can be so classified is when there has been a "mate-
rial" modification of the option. Additionally, with regard to testing when 
corporations are part of a consolidated group based upon options, Reg. 
1.1504-4(c)(4) defines the "measurement date." A "measurement date" 
can be a date on which there are adjustments to the terms of the option. 
Adjustments are excepted that do not materially increase the likelihood 
that the option will be exercised. Also excepted are modifications that are 
determined by a bone fide, reasonable, adjustment formula that has the 
effect of preventing dilution of the interests of the holders of the option. 
Transfers by gift, at death, and pursuant to Section 1041 R4 among others, 
are excluded as well. 
These rules provide helpful guidance. Obviously, the mere fact that 
there is an adjustment to a partnership option should not be enough to 
trigger a testing event to determine whether or not the option should be 
recharacterized as a partnership interest. The change should be substan-
"' Prop. Reg. 1.761-3(c)(3). 
~3 Again, this acronym is borrowed from the ABA Comments, at IVE2. 
~4 Section 1041 treats transfers between spouses while married or purwant to a 
divorce as nontaxable transactions. 
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tial. FUl1her, certain changes. even if arguably substantial, are inherently 
benign-and thus should also not trigger a testing event. Typically the op-
tion holder is not going to be able to prevent all distributions. Partners are 
going to want at least enough distributed to meet their tax Obligations. 
Consequently, many options have automatic adjustment provisions that 
adjust the exercise price for distributions that are made while the option is 
outstanding. Commonly, option agreements have provisions to prevent 
dilution or enhancement, providing that the interest received or the exer-
cise price adjusts should the partnership issue partnership interests or re-
deem them while the option is outstanding. There are many other examples 
where adjustments may occur that are clearly benign in nature and not pal1 
of a subterfuge to give the option holder status equivalent to a partner. 
Some examples: Amendments to the partnership agreement not directly 
involving the option; an amendment to the option agreement not affecting 
the likelihood of exercise or the fundamental rights of the option holder; 
dissolution; liquidation or bankruptcy of the option holder; and taxable 
merger, reorganization, or division of the partnership or the option holder." 
What makes this all especially problematic is that a benign ITM cvent 
couLd trigger partner status due to changes in the underlying economics. 
For example, an option that at the outset would not meet the tests for part~ 
ner slatus might later. Perhaps the business does especially well and now 
it is a virtual certainty that the option will be exercised. If the "substan-
tially simi lar" test is not tightened. as I recommend above, the option holder 
as of the later ITM event may have developed economic benet Its and det-
riments suftlciently similar to a partner so that the substantially similar 
test could be met. If the strong likelihood test is also met, the option bolder 
could suddenly become a partner, even where the ITM event was entirely 
benign and no subterfuge was involved. 
Accordingly, J recommend that the final regulations follow the lead 
of the consolidated return regulations. The finaJ regulations should pro-
vide tbat an ITM event is not triggered for modifications in the option 
agreement that do not materially increase the likelihood that the option 
will be exercised and adjustments that are determined by a bona fide, rea-
sonable, adjustment formula that has the effect of preventing dilution or 
enhancement of the interests of the holders of the option." 
Just as certain changes to the terms of the option are benign and 
should not trigger a recharacterization review. certain transfers of the op-
tion are benign and should be similarly excluded. As the consolidated re-
turn regulations implicitly conclude, gifts, Section 1041 transfers, and 
" See ABA Comments. at IVE2c. 
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transfers at death fall in the latter category and are not likely to be part of, 
or typically even ahle to, contribute to a tax-avoidance scheme. One can 
think of exceptions. A high-bracket donor might gift an iuterest to a low-
bracket donee to make it less likely that the strong likelihood test will be 
met. But the gift tax rules would often take away the incentive for such a 
gambit, and it does not seem like it would be sufficiently common to jus-
tify the existence of a special rule. Other examples of tax free transfe.rs 
that should not trigger an ITM event include termination of a partnership 
under Section 708; a state law conversion of the pa.rtnership;" conversion 
into another entity where the couversion is tax free for federal income tax 
purposes;"' a tax-free merger, reorganization or division ofthe partnership 
or option holder; and tax-free transfers pursuant to Section 332, 351, 368(a), 
721, or 73 J .'9 Tax free transfers do not provide much of an opportunity for 
abuse (and usually none at all), and accordingly, J recommend that the 
final regulations exclude any tax free transfers from the definition of an 
rTM event. 
It would also be helpful if the final regulations would clarify when 
the option is converted if a transfer indeed causes a recharacterization. 
Since the option presumably qualified as such prior to the transfer, logically 
the transfer should he viewed as a transfer of the option by the transferor. The 
recharacterization would then occur in the hands of the transferee.~1 
The proposed regulations imply, but do not explicitly state, that treat-
ing an option holder as a panner is a one-way street. It would make life 
very complicated indeed, perhaps insurmountably so, if an option holder 
could be classified aR a partner then, after another ITM, reclassified as an 
option holder. I would recommend, therefore, that the final regulations 
make the one-way nature of reclassification explicit,''' 
Under the strong likelihood test, an option holder is treated as a part-
ner if the failure to ·do so would result in a suhstantial reduction in the 
present value of the partners' and the option holder's aggregate tax liabili-
ties. A similar, but not ideutical standard is contained in the substantial 
economic effect regulations. These regulations provide that the economic 
effect of an allocation is not suhstantial if on an afler tax, preseut value 
V! Many f'tates permit sUIte Imv partnerships to convert to LLCs by process of law. 
Effectjvely the partnerxhir j~ designated an LLC. There is no need to liqujdate the part~ 
nership or fonn an LLC. 
~B An exmnpJe would be the state-law conversion or a partnership into an LLC See 
Rev. Rut. 95-37. [995,[ CB 130. 
W! See ABA Comments, at IVE2c. 
YO See ABA CommenL<;. at IVFl. 
')j See ABA Comment.'l, at IVE2f. 
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basis there is a strong likelihood at least one partner is better off and none 
of the partners are worse off than if the allocation were not in the partner-
ship agreementn Both tests could take into account tax attributes of a 
partner unrelated to the partnership. Given that the substantial economic 
effect regulations have been in effect since 1985, both tax practitioners 
and the Service have developed a comfort level with them and they speak 
to the same issue.9] I would therefore recommend that the language in the 
proposed regulations be conformed as much as possible to the language in 
the substantial economic effect regulations 94 For example. under the sub-
stantive economic effect regulations, taxpayers do not have to look for-
ward more than five years. Under the test of the proposed regulations, on 
the other hand, there is no five year limit and any future event that has a 
tax impact conceivably wonld have to be considered. It would be best if 
thattes! were adapted to correspond to the existing test contained in the 
substantial economic effect regnlations to which taxpayers (or at least their 
tax advisors) are accustomed," 
Given the highly problematic consequences to the partnership and 
the option holder if the option interest is reeharacterized, it is going to be 
important to taxpayers to have reliable guidance in this regard. If taxpay-
ers are uncertain about the status of an option, they are less likely to use 
optiom, creating economic inefficiencies. Consequently, the final regula-
tions should contain an overarching safe harbor. Taxpayers who comply 
with the safe harbor will know that their option will be respected as such, 
without the need to analyze the substantially similar test The ABA Com-
ments recommend use of the same safe harbor that already exists in the s-
corporation context. An option will not be treated as a second class of S 
corporation stock if the strike price is at least 90% of the fair market value 
of the underlying stockY" That high of a strike price suggests that the 
option is legitimate and not a disguised ownership interest The ABA Com-
mcnts would except from the safe harbor partnerships witb substantially 
certain and predictable income streams, as ahuse could still occur here. 
Even if the 90% safe harbor were met, high-bracket individuals conld avoid 
income by owning options in such partnerships-provided there was a 
sufficient limitations on distributions-and still be confident of the ulti-
"Reg', L104-I(b)(2)(iii)(b)(2) and (0)(2), 
9J "Comfort" could be pushing it Let's say the partIe') have learned tu tolerate them. 
14 To same effect, see ABA Comments, at IV2E2d. 
95 See ABA Comments, at iVE2d. 
;;~ Reg. 1.136l-1 (1)(4)(iii)(C). Under this regulation, a good faith determination of 
fair market value by the corporation is respected unless it can be shown that the value 
was substantially in error and the detennination of tbe value \VUS not performed with 
reasonable diligence to obtain a fair va1ue. 
, " , '. 
I 
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mate return'"' The ABA Comment:;' recommendations seem quite reason-
able, and the fact that the safe harbor is in use in another area means that 
both taxpayers and the Service will be accustomed to its use. The logical 
time to apply a safe harbor would be on the date of an ITM event. It will be 
especially important to adopt the exceptions to an lTM event that I discuss 
above. Otherwise an option that met the safe harbor on issuance conld, 
due to successful partnership operations, fail to meet the safe harbor on a 
subsequent, totally benign event-such as implementation of an anti-dilu-
tion clause in the option agreement. This would in turn undermine the 
whole purpose of safe harbors: To provide taxpayers with confidence that 
if they comply with a given set of rules they will be safe from undesired 
tax consequences. 
Conclusion 
Partnership options in general, and noncompensatory options in particu-
Jar, are becoming increasingly commoll. Yet, anomalously, there was al-
most no guidance as to their tax treatment. The proposed regulations make 
an important first step in providing that guidance. On the whole the pro-
posed regulations are taxpayer-friendly and make a cogent effort to pro-
vide the necessary guidance and prevent abuse. I have (wo main concerns. 
One relates to the fact that in some areas the target is (00 elusive 10 be hit 
squarely, Corrective allocations address a legitimate concern, but the re-
sponse may create more problems than it solves. Some problems are best 
left unattended. In my view (he problems corrective allocations are meant 
to address fall into this category. I would not cause the option holder to 
incur taxable income on the exercise of the option and thus would elimi-
nate the corrective allocation provision of the proposed regulations. Sec-
ondly, some form of recharacterization rules is necessary, and the proposed 
regulations were quite right to create one, but I suggest it be honed more 
finely and give the taxpayers some safe harbors on which to rely. On the 
whole, however, the proposed regulations are fair and balanced and pro-
vide a solid start to developing the guidance the tax law needs in this area. 
9~ See ABA Comments, at IVE3. 
